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The extraterritorial application of United States law has caused growing
unease and criticism abroad in recent years. The most public and dramatic
expressions of these concerns have been in the antitrust area. While this
has been prompted by both government and private antitrust litigation, the
latter has caused the greatest concern, in substantial part because of a belief
that foreign interests are taken into account in the government's
prosecutorial discretion but are likely to receive short shrift in private cases.
It has been suggested that one remedial measure would be greater partici-
pation by the federal government in private antitrust suits which involve
issues of antitrust jurisdiction over conduct abroad and foreign parties, par-
ticularly where foreign governmental policies and interests are implicated.
This paper discusses the question of whether there is a need for a mecha-
nism to identify cases raising such issues and to facilitate government inter-
vention in such suits; and the further question of what steps might be
appropriate.
A. The Rising Level of Foreign Concern
Foreign criticism of the reach of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction is not new. It
accompanied some of the government's anti-cartel cases in the 1940s and
1950s. However, there has been an acute rise in the level of concern and
friction in recent years. Sharp protests have been addressed to the U.S.
government and legislation has been enacted in several countries to limit
discovery and/or block or nullify enforcement of U.S. judgments reached
*Messrs. Kestenbaum and Olson practice law in Washington, D.C.
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as a result of what is thought to be a too expansive view of American anti-
trust jurisdiction.
This increased concern can be ascribed to a number of elements, but a
salient factor has been the volume and impact of private antitrust litigation.
This does not mean that the reach of government enforcement is accepted.
But concern about it is tempered by the fact that many other industrial
nations have their own antitrust programs, and that procedures for inter-
governmental consultation have been developed that assure a level of con-
sideration of foreign interests. No such procedures, of course, apply to pri-
vate litigation; and private litigants have no incentive to moderate their
claims or tactics because of foreign concerns. In the year ending June 30,
1980, 1,457 antitrust suits were filed, more than six times the number two
decades earlier. Most of these are private suits and while, obviously, rela-
tively few raise issues of extraterritoriality, some well-publicized cases have,
notably the recent uranium litigation.
The prospect of taking account of foreign interests in private antitrust
cases has been brought to the fore by Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977) and Mannington Mills, Inc. P. Con-
goleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). For three decades the "effects"
doctrine as enunciated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) was largely accepted and left unelaborated.
Timberlane and Mannington Mills have signalled reexamination of the
exercise of antitrust jurisdiction in foreign commerce cases, bringing into
the analysis a balancing process which includes considerations of comity
and foreign interests. This subject is also under active consideration by the
American Law Institute in its revision of the Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions Law, the tentative draft of which proposes a balancing process as part
of a standard of reasonableness to govern antitrust jurisdiction in extraterri-
torial situations.1
The new approach is in its early stages and has not yet answered the
concerns of foreign governments regarding the reach of the U.S. antitrust
laws. 2 7imberlane and Mannington Mills may presage a flexible view of
jurisdiction, including due weight to foreign governmental interests. But
there has not yet been any case decided purely on the ground that antitrust
jurisdiction should not be exercised because of the balance of interests. 3
'The ALl, Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised),
Tentative Draft No. 2, Introductory Note, pp. 87-95, Sections 402, 403, 415 (pp. 97-114, 131-
142), March 27, 1981.
'Davis R. Robinson, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State, took note of the embry-
onic state of the law in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Dec. 3, 1981:
But while cases such as Timberlane and Manningion Mills represent a start, our law in this
area is still relatively undeveloped. In my view, much remains to be done to articulate
appropriate standards to guide the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction in this area.3A recent Tenth Circuit opinion, following Timberlane, upheld a jury verdict for defendants,
American companies accused of conspiring not to sell potash mined in Canada to a Canadian
commodities trader. In upholding the verdict, the court stated that "[c]omity concerns out-
weigh any effect on United States commerce," thus making U.S. jurisdiction unwarranted, but
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Indeed, the two cases might be interpreted as actually lowering the thresh-
old jurisdiction requirement below Alcoa. In the uranium litigation, the
balancing of interests aspect of the new approach was not confirmed. In the
Westinghouse litigation, the Seventh Circuit stated that the balancing fac-
tors were not yet the law in its circuit and declined to apply them as a
prerequisite to a default judgment against non-appearing foreign parties.
Not only did the Court reject foreign governments' representations that the
balancing process should precede entry of such a default judgment, but it
responded with a highly offensive challenge to the integrity of those
governments.4
The Antitrust Division has pointed to Timberlane and Mannington Mills
as indicating that the courts will undertake a balancing process similar to
that performed by the Division in its enforcement decisions; in its view, the
resulting "jurisdictional rule of reason" should alleviate foreign concerns.5
Some foreign observers have responded that the Antitrust Division should
accept responsibility for the realization of this goal - at the least, that it
should participate in a systematic way in private antitrust cases to insist
upon its adoption and proper implementation. 6
It is likely that there will be occasions for such government involvement
in private cases. Foreign trade is playing an increasing role in our econ-
omy. This means that conduct abroad will increasingly have effect in the
United States, providing a possible basis for American antitrust jurisdic-
tion. Foreign government intervention into economic matters will also con-
tinue, taking diverse forms, including policies inconsistent with a strict rule
of competition. Furthermore, foreign nations will not accept a U.S.-cen-
tered view of the impact of foreign trade restraints or regulation. The
expectation that the problems reflected in recent cases will recur reinforces
the arguments for U.S. government participation on a regular basis in pri-
vate antitrust litigation raising issues of extraterritoriality. Such participa-
also ruled that dismissal was justified because there were "insufficient contacts with and effects
upon commerce within the United States to justify federal court jurisdiction." Montreal Trad-
ing Co. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 868-871 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, March 8, 1982.
Because of the lack of sufficient contacts, the comity finding does not seem essential to the
court's result.
4In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980) characterized
the foreign governments as "surrogates" of the defaulting companies who "subserviently"
presented the companies' arguments against jurisdiction. (For the U.S. government's reaction,
see infra at note 9.) The district court in that case subsequently denied defendants' motions for
summary judgment on comity grounds, stating that there were factual issues requiring trial
and that comity was a matter of discretion, citing also the absence of U.S. government
representations.
'See, e.g., Shenefield, The Extra-Territorial Impact of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Causes and Con-
sequences, Remarks to the ABA Section on International Law, New York, August 9, 1978 at
20; Shenefield, Extraterritoriality and Antitrust - New Variations on a Familiar Theme,
Remarks before the International Law Institute and the ABA International Law Section,
Washington, D.C., December 10, 1980 at 7.
'Eg., Hermann, Extraterritorial Application of National Laws Regulating Business Activities,
7 DITCHLEY J. (No. 2) 14, 19-20, 22 (1980); see also Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and
Reasonableness.- A Reply to A. V Lowe, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 629, 631, n.12.
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tion could both help assuage foreign concerns and help the courts move
toward a consistent, unified and sensible doctrine regarding application of
the antitrust laws to conduct and entities outside the United States.
B. The Present Status of Federal Governmental
Intervention in Private Antitrust Litigation
There is at present no clear policy regarding federal government partici-
pation as amicus curiae or otherwise in private cases raising issues of juris-
diction over conduct and parties abroad and conflict with foreign
governmental policy. Decisions on whether to participate as amicus in pri-
vate cases at the appellate level are the responsibility of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office. The Solicitor General's office may be invited by the Supreme
Court to express its views, a request which usually is made at the petition
stage. In addition, the Solicitor General's office regularly reviews private
cases accepted by the Court to see if they raise issues in which there is
sufficient governmental interest to participate. This involves consultation
with the appropriate division within the Justice Department and with other
interested agencies, who may also initiate such consideration. These proce-
dures result in a considerable number of amicus briefs being filed at the
Court by the Solicitor General's office every year, including about twenty
briefs on the merits. Such amicus briefs have been filed frequently in pri-
vate antitrust cases.
Government amicus appearances at lower appellate levels are also sub-
ject to the supervision of the Solicitor General, whose approval is required
for such action by Justice Department divisions or other government enti-
ties (like the Cabinet Departments) which do not have independent litigat-
ing authority.7 Thus, the Antitrust Division would request the approval of
the Solicitor General. If approval is granted, the Division itself is generally
responsible for the amicus presentation, although in some instances the
Solicitor General's office may remain involved to some extent. Recent ami-
cus appearances in the courts of appeals have included private cases in
which the government expressed views on issues of implied exemption from
the antitrust laws.
At the trial court level, the divisions of the Justice Department have
independent authority to decide on amicus participation. There have been
very few such participations by the Antitrust Division. Thus, our infor-
mants recalled only one participation at the trial court level in a private
antitrust case and that participation was as a party-intervenor at one stage
of the lengthy Thill Securities Co. Y. New York Stock Exchange litigation. s
'The authority of the Solicitor General in this area is provided for by 28 C.F.R. § 0.20
(1980).
'The Civil Division is responsible for amicus participation at the trial court level on sover-
eign immunity issues. Before the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, this was done fairly fre-
quently, by filing suggestions of interest. The Division considered that the Act made the issue
a matter of law so that foreign governments can properly appear and argue without interven-
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In one recent famous case, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp.
553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), af'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), the Division did
not participate as amicus notwithstanding a specific request by the district
judge.
No regularized procedure exists for bringing cases posing questions of the
reach of U.S. jurisdiction abroad to the attention of either the Solicitor
General's office, the Antitrust Division or any other federal governmental
body. However, the lack of a formal procedure does not appear to have
hindered federal participation. At the Supreme Court level, the Solicitor
General's office feels that existing procedures work well and that no special
rule is appropriate for the few cases raising such issues. In the lower courts
as well, no special problem appears to have arisen due to the government's
lack of awareness. Justice Department sources indicate that the foreign
parties and their United States counsel in such cases know how to bring
such issues to the attention of the appropriate United States government
agencies, by representations to the State Department or other means.
The rarity of amicus participation by the Antitrust Division at the trial
court level may be attributed to a number of factors, which also apply to
cases involving extraterritoriality issues. The Division normally has incom-
plete information about the facts in private cases. Consequently, it would
not be prepared to take a position on issues that require assessment of facts.
This will be true of extraterritoriality and comity issues, at least with respect
to the results of applying the principles of Timberlane, Mannington Mills
and the Restatement to the facts of specific cases. The Division's reluctance
to act without full inquiry in these cases is probably enhanced by a reluc-
tance to take any position limiting antitrust jurisdiction. There also may be
internal disagreement about the application of the balancing process in a
particular case. Finally, there may be extrinsic factors, as in the OPEC
case, where it was apparently considered simply unacceptable to appear on
the side of OPEC regardless of the merits. Where the private parties are
well represented, leaving them to litigate often appears sensible, especially
in the trial court.
Yet on these extraterritoriality issues, if the Division is to provide helpful
guidance, its expression of views should take place at the trial court level,
indeed at an early stage of the proceeding. Even if the Division is not pre-
pared to assess the relevant facts and to take a position on whether antitrust
jurisdiction should be exercised in a particular case, it can urge the court to
take account of factors which bear upon comity and the reasonableness of
exercising jurisdiction. It should further urge the court to undertake its
tion or appearance of the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the Civil Division has continued to
appear in some cases involving foreign governmental entities upon request of the State Depart-
ment and the foreign government, e.g., on whether the extent of contacts with the U.S. were
sufficient to provide a basis for jurisdiction. In addition, the Division has appeared in several
International Trade Commission cases to convey the concern of foreign governments, and in
Iranian claims litigation to implement the hostage agreement.
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decision on the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction as early as possible, recog-
nizing that foreign government interests can be offended by undue deferral
of the jurisdictional decision. And it can provide to the court authoritative
assessments of factors within the nature of its knowledge, such as foreign
government interests and the impact on U.S. foreign relations.
C. Possible Means of Encouraging Federal Participation in
Private Antitrust Litigation Raising
Questions of Extraterritoriality
We have considered a number of avenues which might alleviate foreign
concern over private antitrust cases involving conduct and parties abroad
and conflict with foreign governmental policy. These include a formal noti-
fication procedure, statutory provisions for intervention and/or expedited
appeals, and policy statements by various governmental bodies indicating a
readiness to intervene to address such issues.
1. A formal notification procedure could be modeled on 28 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 2403(a) which requires courts to certify to the Attorney General any
case wherein the "constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the
public interest is drawn in question." But our inquiry does not suggest that
a formal notification procedure would be useful or necessary. There seems
little likelihood that private cases raising issues of extraterritoriality will not
be addressed because they somehow slip through the cracks and are not
noticed.
In addition, there would be serious problems in defining the circum-
stances in which notification would be called for. The fact that there are
foreign parties, even foreign governmental parties, or that legal process will
extend to foreign countries is not sufficient. Many such matters are rou-
tinely litigated. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad reflect a preference for having such
issues handled by courts in the normal course, rather than by diplomatic
negotiation.
Furthermore, it does not appear practical to provide for notification in
terms limited to issues of serious concern, e.g., when the case involves a
substantial defense of comity or foreign law, or a substantial impact upon
foreign governmental interests or U.S. foreign relations. This will not nor-
mally be evident from pleadings; and when a serious problem arises, the
parties and foreign governments are aware of it and can bring it to the
attention of the Justice and State Departments, as they have in the past.
Thus, while it would be theoretically possible to enact legislation requiring
courts to notify the government of the cases which give rise to concern, such
a statute would appear to impose a burden on the courts without contribut-
ing significantly to a solution of the perceived problem.
2. A statute could be adopted allowing amicus participation by the
United States in private cases raising issues of jurisdiction over conduct and
parties abroad and conflict with foreign governmental policy. Such legisla-
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tion could be similar to 28 U.S.C. Section 2403(a), which allows interven-
tion by the United States to the extent of presenting evidence where the
constitutionality of a federal statute is brought into question. The degree of
intervention allowed could either be as broad as that provided for by Sec-
tion 2403(a) or limited to the filing of amicus briefs.
The argument against such legislation is principally that need for it has
not been shown. There is no reason to anticipate that amicus participation,
when sought by the United States, would not be granted by the federal
courts. It has been suggested that a statute would encourage the Justice
Department to overcome counter-pressures and to adopt a program of help-
ing to shape the rules governing antitrust extraterritorial jurisdiction. But
since the statute would have to be in general terms, leaving discretion in the
government, it would not appear to be much of an advance.
3. A related suggestion has been for a statutory provision authorizing
amicus participation by foreign governments. One purpose would be to
avoid a repetition of the embarrassingly offensive treatment accorded for-
eign governments in the uranium litigation. The U.S. government
responded to that incident with two extraordinary letters, writing the Sev-
enth Circuit and the district court to assert the legitimacy of the foreign
governments' interests and the propriety of their amicus participation. 9 It is
hard to believe that a statute is required to preclude recurrence of that
extreme situation. No statute has been needed to obtain amicus status for
foreign governments when sought. Nevertheless, the uranium litigation has
demonstrated to foreign governments that their views are likely to have
only modest impact, unless endorsed, seconded, or presented by the U.S.
executive branch. Even apart from the Seventh Circuit's offensive state-
ment, the courts have not evidenced a willingness to credit foreign interests
in the absence of an expression by the U.S. government.' 0 Accordingly,
while foreign governments may appreciate assurance of an unencumbered
opportunity to express their views, their emphasis is likely to be upon the
desirability of, or the need for, Justice Department participation.
4. A more far-reaching proposal would be to couple the type of interven-
tion extending as far as the presentation of evidence allowed by 28 U.S.C.
Section 2403(a) with a right to obtain an expedited proceeding including
direct expedited appeal to the Supreme Court on the extraterritoriality
issues. These rights could be granted to the United States or foreign gov-
ernments or both.
'Letter of Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to John H.
Shenefield, Associate Attorney General (March 17, 1980), transmitted to the Court of Appeals
by the Associate Attorney General at the Legal Adviser's request, reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 665 (1980). Letter of John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, to District Judge
Prentice H. Marshall (May 6, 1980), reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 50,416.
"In fact, in the uranium litigation itself, Judge Marshall inferred that the United States was
content to see the matter litigated partially because of the absence of any U.S. government
expression. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, Transcript of Dec. 17, 1980 Hearing, pp. 9-10.
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Such a proposal has been offered as a solution to foreign concerns. A
procedure for resolution of extraterritoriality issues at an early stage of a
case can be highly desirable, particularly when substantial foreign govern-
mental interests are involved. However, there are objections. Enactment of
such procedures may complicate and delay private antitrust litigation. Nor
is it clear that extraterritoriality issues can be separated and tried apart
from the rest of a case. At the least, it has been argued, the balancing test
for jurisdiction includes such elements as the extent of contacts with the
various jurisdictions and the impact of relief, which it may not be possible
to appraise in advance. Finally, a proposal to add another direct appeal to
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction runs against the efforts in recent years
which have successfully eliminated direct appeals of right in several fields,
including antitrust.
5. A modest proposal would be for the United States government to
adopt and to announce a policy of regularly appearing as amicus in cases
which present substantial issues of the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction over
conduct abroad and/or foreign entities, and in which there are significant
conflicting foreign interests. The purpose of such appearances would be to
urge the use of a balancing process which gives due weight to foreign inter-
ests in reaching a decision to exercise U.S. antitrust jurisdiction. In appro-
priate cases, the United States should be prepared to go further and to take
a position on the application of these principles to the facts in the particular
case. The commitment to an explicit policy should help overcome the Jus-
tice Department's traditional reluctance to participate amicus. The imple-
mentation of the commitment would aim at helping the courts formulate a
doctrine of jurisdiction in cases involving extraterritoriality issues that is
coherent, consistent and has sensible limits.
This proposal could be accomplished without new legislation. The policy
could be announced, e.g., by joint statement of the Attorney General and
the Secretary of State, or perhaps the Assistant Attorney General for Anti-
trust and the Legal Adviser. This statement could invite foreign govern-
ments and parties to bring appropriate cases to the attention of the
Departments and would provide assurance to foreign governments that
their views will be considered. (It would also have the effect of encouraging
courts to solicit the U.S. government's views.) The Departments can seek to
obtain the explicit endorsements of the relevant congressional committees
for the policy, which would tend to reinforce it as a continuing policy.
There are arguments against adoption of such a policy. First, it might be
said that there are sometimes sound reasons for the government not to
appear in private antitrust cases, which explain why it has not generally
been done, and thus argues against a commitment to do so in all cases
involving substantial extraterritoriality issues. Second, the U.S. govern-
ment interest in the legal principles or in foreign relations effects will vary.
Third, the resources diverted to carry out this commitment are uncertain
and unpredictable. We do not know how many cases there will be, so that
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announcement of a policy may result in a serious drain on governmental
resources. Fourth, antitrust cases are not the only situations raising extra-
territoriality and foreign policy issues, and any policy of amicus interven-
tion would have to apply to a broad range of cases and issues. These
factors figured in the State Department's recent response to a foreign gov-
ernment request, declining to provide any assurance or undertaking that the
Department would advise U.S. courts of its position on foreign relations
and comity issues in cases which the foreign government identified as
involving its significant interests. In the Department's view, such amicus
participation has to be considered on a case-by-case basis; and it evidently
believes that with the exception of the Seventh Circuit's decision in the ura-
nium litigation, the procedure for amicus filings by foreign governments has
worked well. I I
These points are not without merit. However, in our view they are not
sufficient to reject the proposed policy of amicus participation. In addition
to factors already discussed, we note that the Antitrust Division has recently
announced that it will intervene more frequently as amicus in what it
regards as significant private antitrust cases, in the interests of a rational
development of antitrust law.' 2 This is consistent with the type of cases
here under consideration. The practical burden of brief writing on extrater-
ritorial antitrust issues will fall most heavily on the Antitrust Division,
which has thus proclaimed itself capable of handling even more extensive
amicus participation than is proposed here. There would also be residual
discretion in the government in determining that a case presented substan-
tial extraterritoriality issues.
Further, there are sound reasons why a policy statement of amicus partic-
ipation should be addressed to, and at this stage limited to, antitrust cases
raising such issues. This area has been a particularly exacerbating problem
for foreign governments and parties, so that an effort to deal with it would
seem to make sense. Most other conflicts have involved enforcement activi-
ties by government executive or regulatory bodies (e.g., antiboycott, other
trading restrictions), not private litigation. It is for this reason that the
extreme foreign reactions, as evidenced by the U.K. Protection of Trading
Interests Act and similar proposals elsewhere, have focused upon coun-
tering the effect of antitrust damage litigation.
"Response of the United States Department of State, dated Oct. 16, 1981 to the Embassy of
Australia's Diplomatic Note No. 120 (April 7, 1981).
'"See W. Baxter, International Aspects of Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks before House
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary, Nov. 19,
1981, at 8-9; M. Cutler, Some Antitrust Division Views on Vertical Restraints: Public Policy
and Private Actions, Remarks before the Twenty-First Annual Advanced Antitrust Seminar
on Distribution and Marketing, Dec. 8, 1981 (committing the Antitrust Division to "systematic
participation" in private cases at both the trial and appellate levels); see also J. Shenefield,
Extraterritoriality and Antitrust - New Variations on a Familiar Theme, Remarks before the
International Law Institute and the ABA International Law Section, Washington, D.C., Dec.
10, 1980 at 19.
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Giving due weight to the opposing arguments, our view is that they are
outweighed by the U.S. interest in the proper development of antitrust law
in foreign commerce and by the value of foreign relations objectives. The
government should undertake the responsibility of participating in a sys-
tematic way in private antitrust litigation raising substantial extraterritorial-
ity issues to advance the adoption and implementation of rules which take
due account of foreign interests.
D. Conclusion
The federal courts are currently groping toward a new doctrine of juris-
diction in cases involving extraterritoriality issues and conflicts with the
laws and policies of other countries, particularly in the antitrust field. It
would make sense for the Justice Department to participate in helping to
shape that doctrine in accord with principles of international comity and
reasonableness in exercise of jurisdiction, whether in the context of govern-
ment or private antitrust litigation.
Of the various steps considered, it does not appear necessary or useful to
provide for a system of notification to the federal government of private
antitrust cases raising issues of extraterritoriality. There is no reason to
expect that such issues, when significant, are not being brought to the atten-
tion of the government. A statute authorizing the United States govern-
ment (or foreign governments) to intervene in such private litigation,
including expedited appeal procedures, would raise practical and other
objections.
The most feasible and desirable course of action would seem to be for the
U.S. government to adopt formally an explicit policy of participation as
amicus in private litigation involving issues of jurisdiction over conduct
outside the U.S. and/or foreign parties, and of confficting policies and
interests of other nations. An active Justice Department role in these suits
should be of substantial assistance to the federal courts in developing rules
in this area. Adoption of this policy should also help alleviate the concerns
of foreign governments over the consequences of private treble-damage liti-
gation affecting their interests.
June 1, 1982
